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a b s t r a c t
There is strong evidence that we automatically simulate observed behavior in our motor
system. Previous research suggests that this simulation process depends on whether we
observe a human or a non-human agent. Measuring a motor priming effect, this study
investigated the question of whether agent-sensitivity of motor simulation depends on
the specific action observed. Participants saw pictures depicting end positions of different
actions on a screen. All postures featured either a human or non-human agent. Participants
had to produce the matching action with their left or right hand depending on the hand
presented on the screen. Three different actions were displayed: a communicative action
(emblem), a transitive (goal-directed) action and an intransitive action. We found motor
priming effects of similar size for human and non-human agents for transitive and intran-
sitive actions. However, the motor priming effect for communicative actions was present
for the human agent, but absent for the non-human agent. These findings suggest that bio-
logical tuning of motor simulation is highly action-selective and depends on whether the
observed behavior appears to be driven by a reasonable goal.
! 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
An extensive body of brain imaging research suggests
that passive observation of human action leads to activa-
tion of brain areas that are also involved in motor prepara-
tion and execution (Buccino et al., 2001; Fogassi et al.,
2005; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Gazzola,
Aziz-Zadeh, & Keysers, 2006; Grezes, Armony, Rowe, &
Passingham, 2003; Iacoboni et al., 1999). Furthermore,
behavioral research strongly suggests that the observation
of an action activates a corresponding motor representa-
tion in the observer. This phenomenon has been termed
motor simulation (for an overview see Brass and Heyes,
2005 and Blakemore and Frith, 2005). Motor simulation
is typically measured with a motor priming paradigm, in
which participants have to carry out an instructed re-
sponse while observing task-irrelevant congruent or incon-
gruent actions (e.g., Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, &
Prinz, 2000). It has been demonstrated that the observation
of a finger movement that corresponds to the instructed
finger movement leads to facilitation of the response and
observing a non-corresponding finger movement leads to
interference (Bertenthal, Longo, & Kosobud, 2006; Brass
et al., 2000; Stürmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2003).
2. Motor simulation of biological and non-biological
agents
One issue that is still controversial iswhethermotor sim-
ulation is restricted to observing human agents or also oc-
curs for non-human agents (Gazzola, Rizzolatti, Wicker, &
Keysers, 2007; Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003; Press,
Bird, Flach, & Heyes, 2005). A range of studies provide evi-
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dence that only actions produced by human agents lead to
motor priming effects and not when these actions are pro-
duced by non-human agents (Kilner et al., 2003; Tai, Scher-
fler, Brooks, Sawamoto, & Castiello, 2004; see also Tsai &
Brass, 2007). Other studies support the idea of attenuated
motor priming for non-humanmovements (Liepelt & Brass,
2010; Longo& Bertenthal, 2009; Press, Gillmeister, & Heyes,
2006; Press et al., 2005). There is, however, also neuroimag-
ing evidence showing similar activation in the mirror sys-
tem for human and non-human movement stimuli
(Gazzola et al., 2007; see also Jansson, Wilson, Williams, &
Mon-Williams, 2007; Stanley, Gowen, & Miall, 2007).
While the role of the observed agent has been exten-
sively investigated, it is still an open question whether mo-
tor priming might also depend on the interaction of the
agent and the specific movement executed by the agent.
This, however, seems important, because not only humans,
but also non-human agents might have a restricted range
of actions that we perceive as a reasonable part of their ac-
tion repertoire. Interestingly, there is one brain imaging
study that has investigated whether we motorically simu-
late actions carried out by animals. This study revealed
strong activation in motor-related areas whenever the ob-
served behavior was also in the behavioral repertoire of the
observer (e.g., biting) but not when it was not in his reper-
toire (Buccino et al., 2004). Furthermore, it has been dem-
onstrated that the observation of biologically impossible
movements does not lead to motor priming (Longo, Koso-
bud, & Bertenthal, 2008; but see Candidi, Urgesi, Ionta, &
Aglioti, 2008). These studies seem to suggest that motor
priming only occurs when the observed behavior is also
in the behavioral repertoire of the observer. However, Lie-
pelt and colleagues recently demonstrated that motor
priming effects also depend on the interpretation of an ob-
served behavior as intentional or unintentional (Liepelt,
von Cramon, & Brass, 2008). In this study, the observed
behavior was in the behavioral repertoire of the observer
but was not interpreted as intentionally carried out by
the model. One potential way to further test this idea is
to present a behavior that the observer would not consider
as a reasonable part of the behavioral repertoire of the ob-
served agent but is part of the behavioral repertoire of the
observer. A robot, for example, might be able to produce a
simple hand-closing gesture when grasping an object.
However, one would not expect a robot to carry out a com-
municative gesture, such as a handshake, because you
would not consider it as a reasonable behavior for a robot.
This would suggest that motor simulation does not involve
the simulation of the direct physical movement, but also of
the goals of actions (Bekkering, Wohlschlager, & Gattis,
2000; Ochiai, Mushiake, & Tanji, 2005).
3. The present study
The aim of the present study was to test whether motor
simulation is not only agent sensitive (human or non-hu-
man), but also sensitive to the specific action type per-
formed by the agent. The experimental design was
slightly different from the paradigms used in previous mo-
tor priming studies (e.g., Brass et al., 2000) and resembles
to some extent a study on object affordances by Tucker
and Ellis (1998). We developed movement stimuli for three
different types of actions: a communicative action (em-
blem) showing a typical handshake gesture, a transitive
(goal-directed) action showing a hand grasping an apple
and an intransitive action showing a hand-closing gesture
pursuing no further goal. These actions were either exe-
cuted by a non-human agent or by a human agent. We pre-
dict that the motor priming effect should not differ for
observing human or non-human agents as long as the ob-
served behavior could be considered as a reasonable goal
of the agent (i.e., simple transitive or intransitive move-
ments). However, when the observed behavior cannot be
considered a reasonable goal for the non-human agent
(i.e., a communicative gesture) the motor priming effect




A group of 27 undergraduate students (14 males, age
range: 21–28, mean age: 23.8, SD: 2.0) participated in this
experiment. All participants were right-handed, had nor-
mal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were naive with re-
gard to the hypotheses of the experiment. Participants
were paid €7 for participation.
4.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli
Stimuli were presented on a 17-in. color monitor that
was connected to a Pentium I PC. Experiments were carried
out using ERTS software (Experimental Runtime System;
Beringer, 2000). The stimuli consisted of one still picture
of a right or left hand photographed from a third person
perspective presented in the middle of the screen (see
Fig. 1). The picture showed the end position of one of three
gestures (communicative, intransitive, transitive). For the
communicative gesture, the hand was shown in a typical
handshake gesture. For the intransitive gesture, the final
part of a hand closing movement was shown and for the
transitive gesture, we showed a hand grasping an apple.
The same gesture was presented depicting two different
agents (human, wooden). After a time interval of 800 ms,
an additional number (1 or 2) was presented above the
hand. The number always appeared in the same position.
At a viewing distance of 80 cm, the hand on the screen sub-
tended a visual angle of 5.71" ! 12.33" (communicative),
4.22" ! 7.97" (intransitive), 7.27" ! 8.39" (transitive) and
the number, 0.29" ! 0.72".
4.1.3. Procedure and design
An adapted version of the paradigm developed by Brass
et al. (2000) was used in the present experiment. Partici-
pants had to release either the index finger of their left
or right hand from a response board as indicated by a num-
ber (1: left index finger, 2: right index finger) and form one
of three possible gestures (communicative, intransitive or
transitive) corresponding to the gesture presented on the
screen. Each gesture type was given in separate blocks.
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Depending on the presented hand stimulus (left or right
hand), the response hand was lifted either congruently or
incongruently in response to the number. In congruent tri-
als, the observed hand and the required response hand
were presented in a mirror perspective (e.g., left-hand re-
sponse to the example hand cues shown in Fig. 1). In incon-
gruent trials, the observed hand and the required response
hand were presented in a complementary perspective (e.g.,
right-hand response to the example hand cues shown in
Fig. 1). Participants were instructed to respond to the num-
bers irrespective of the observed hand (left or right hand)
on the screen.
Each trial began with a frame lasting for 800 ms show-
ing the hand stimulus in an end position. In the second
frame, the same hand was presented and additionally a di-
git appeared above the stimulus hand for 1915 ms. A tone
that informed participants whether a response was mea-
sured (due to the correct use of the response board) was gi-
ven for 50 ms followed by a blank screen for 2100 ms. Each
trial lasted 4865 ms in total (see Fig. 2).
Before running the experiment, we presented either a
static real human hand or a static wooden analogue model
of a hand to all participants. They were told that they
would see pictures of the respective hand model in differ-
ent gestures on the screen during the experiment. This
statement was included in the general instructions with-
out any special emphasis. Each gesture (communicative,
intransitive, transitive) was presented for two blocks, each
consisting of 64 trials, separated by a short break. Wooden
and human hands were randomly presented in each of the
blocks. The order of gesture types was counterbalanced
across participants. Participant performed 384 trials in
total.
4.2. Results
In all experiments prior to statistical analyses, all trials
in which responses were incorrect (1.4%) or outliers (1.2%)
that were three standard deviations above or below the
mean group Reaction Times (RTs) were excluded from sta-
tistical RT analyses. Congruency effects for all conditions
are presented in Fig. 3. For an overview of mean RTs and
mean percent errors of all conditions of Experiment 1,
including main effects, see Table 1.
4.2.1. RT analysis
We used a 2 ! 3 ! 2-factorial design including the 2-le-













Fig. 1. The figures show the stimuli and design of two agents (human, wooden) and three gesture types (communicative, intransitive, transitive) used in
Experiment 1. All stimuli are shown from a third person perspective displaying a right hand in a mirror-congruent condition.
Fig. 2. Shown is the stimulus sequence for each trial as used in the present experiments. Each trial started with a picture (displayed for 800 ms) showing a
static hand. In the second frame (displayed for 1915 ms), the symbolic imperative stimulus ‘1’ or ‘2’ appeared centrally above the hand. Participants had to
respond within 2000 ms. The reaction was followed by a tone for 50 ms and a constant blank screen for 2100 ms.
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ture (communicative, intransitive, transitive), as well as
the 2-level factor Congruency (congruent, incongruent),
with all factors as within-subject variables (see Figs. 1
and 3). The same analysis was conducted for accuracy data.
In the present experiment, we observed no main effect
of Agent, F(1, 26) = 1.85, MSe = 83.16, p > 0.05, partial
g2 = 0.07. We found a main effect of Gesture, F(2, 52) =
11.57, MSe = 1496.79, p < 0.001, partial g2 = 0.31, with the
fastest RTs for the intransitive gesture (383 ms), followed
by the transitive gesture (397 ms) and slowest RTs for
the communicative gesture (406 ms). Further, we found a
significant effect of Congruency, F(1, 26) = 7.86, MSe =
286.08, p < 0.05, partial g2 = 0.23, due to faster RTs in con-
gruent (392 ms) as compared to incongruent conditions
(398 ms). We found no significant effects of Agent !
Gesture, F(2, 52) = 1.37, MSe = 106.90, p > 0.05, partial
g2 = 0.05 and Agent ! Congruency, F(1, 26) = 3.04, MSe =
126.25, p > 0.05, partial g2 = 0.11. However, we observed
a significant effect of Gesture ! Congruency, F(2, 52) =
18.55, MSe = 168.27, p < 0.001, partial g2 = 0.42, indicating
faster responses to complementary actions than to mirror
actions for the communicative gesture, while transitive
and intransitive gestures showed the typical congruency
effect with faster responses for mirror actions than for
complementary actions. Most importantly, we found a sig-
nificant three-way interaction of Agent ! Gesture ! Congru-
ency, F(2, 52) = 4.14, MSe = 141.28, p < 0.05, partial g2 =
0.14, indicating that the inverse congruency effect for the
communicative gesture in the human agent condition
amounting to 14 ms, t(26) = 3.39, p < 0.05 was completely
eliminated for the communicative gesture in the wooden
condition, t(26) = 0.14, p = 0.89. This was not the case for
the intransitive and transitive gesture conditions (see
Fig. 3). For the intransitive gesture, we observed a congru-
ency effect amounting to 12 ms, t(26) = 4.41, p < 0.001 for
the human agent condition and of 13 ms, t(26) = 4.20,
p < 0.001 for the wooden condition. For the transitive ges-
ture, the congruency effect amounted to 12 ms for the hu-
man agent, t(26) = 3.72, p 6 0.001 and 9 ms for the wooden
agent, t(26) = 2.27, p < 0.05.
4.2.2. Error analysis
We observed no main effect of Agent, F(1, 26) = 1.35,
MSe = 5.71, p > 0.05, partial g2 = 0.05, indicating that par-
ticipants in the human and in the wooden condition did
not differ in error rates. We found a main effect of Gesture,
F(2, 52) = 4.67, MSe = 5.15, p < 0.05, partial g2 = 0.15, due to
increased error rates for the intransitive gesture (1.9%), as
compared to the communicative (1.1%) and the transitive
(1.1%) gestures. For errors, we found no significant effect
of Congruency, F(1, 26) = 3.08, MSe = 3.92, p > 0.05, partial
g2 = 0.11. Further, we found no significant effects of
Agent ! Gesture (F < 1) and Agent ! Congruency (F < 1).
The interaction of Gesture ! Congruency was significant,
F(2, 52) = 5.63, MSe = 5.67, p < 0.05, partial g2 = 0.18,
Fig. 3. Congruency effect (incongruent minus congruent) in milliseconds (ms) plotted with the SE of the congruency effect for Experiment 1 shown for
communicative (left panel, light gray), intransitive (middle panel, white) and transitive gestures (right panel, dark gray) of the human agent (blank bars)
and the wooden agent (striped bars).
Table 1
Mean reaction times (RTs) in milliseconds (ms) and percent errors (upper
part) are shown for Agent (human, wooden), Gesture (communicative,
intransitive, transitive) and Congruency (congruent, incongruent) condi-
tions of Experiment 1. Corresponding p-values for within-subjects effects
(lower part) are shown separately for RTs and percent errors.
Condition RT (ms) Error (%)
Human communicative congruent 414 1.5
Human communicative incongruent 399 0.9
Wooden communicative congruent 405 1.3
Wooden communicative incongruent 405 0.7
Human intransitive congruent 375 1.4
Human intransitive incongruent 387 2.9
Wooden intransitive congruent 377 1.0
Wooden intransitive incongruent 390 2.2
Human transitive congruent 390 1.0
Human transitive incongruent 402 1.3
Wooden transitive congruent 394 0.7
Wooden transitive incongruent 403 1.3
Within-subjects p(RT) p(Error)
Agent (A) n.s. n.s.
Gesture (G) <0.001b <0.05a
Congruency (C) <0.05a n.s.
A ! G n.s. n.s.
A ! C n.s. n.s.
G ! C <0.001b <0.05a
A ! G ! C <0.05a n.s.
a Sign (p < 0.05).
b Sign (p < 0.001), n.s. (p > 0.05).
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indicating the same trend as for RTs showing numerically
fewer errors for the complementary action than for the
mirror action for the communicative gesture, while the
typical congruency effect was found for transitive and
intransitive gestures, showing fewer errors for mirror ac-
tions than for complementary actions. Importantly, we
found no significant three-way interaction of Agent ! Ges-
ture ! Congruency (F < 1), indicating no evidence of a
speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT) as an explanation for the
observed RT effects.
4.3. Discussion
Using a variant of the classical motor priming paradigm,
we were able to show clear compatibility effects for transi-
tive and intransitive movements regardless of whether
participants observed postures of a biological or a non-bio-
logical agent. In these two conditions, we found a compat-
ibility effect of a similar size. Most importantly, however,
we found a differential compatibility effect for observing
a communicative gesture made by a human or non-human
agent. A reversed compatibility effect was found when
observing a human extending the right hand for a hand-
shake. This reversal of the compatibility effect is not sur-
prising given that we usually shake an extended right
hand with our right hand, leading to spatial incompatibil-
ity of the relative position of the hand (see also Flach, Press,
Badet, & Heyes, 2010). For the non-human agent, however,
this effect completely disappeared. This strongly indicates
that the learned response to extend the right hand when
observing a right hand is only activated when observing
a human agent but not when observing this gesture made
by a non-human agent.
While this finding is interesting in itself, extending the
idea of a complementary action system to communicative
behavior (Newman-Norlund, van Schie, van Zuijlen, & Bek-
kering, 2007; Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006; van
Schie, van Waterschoot, & Bekkering, 2008), it may con-
strain the conclusions that can be drawn from the present
experiment. The smaller motor priming effect for non-
human actions might not be due to the communicative
nature of the gesture, but rather to the specific comple-
mentary action used in Experiment 1. Furthermore, direct
hand-to-hand contact, which would be the usual response
in such a situation, might lead to an aversive response
when a non-human agent attempts to shake hands with
you. This could alternatively explain the reduced motor
priming effect in the specific non-human communicative
action condition used in Experiment 1.
5. Experiment 2
We designed a second experiment in which we aimed
to (a) replicate our findings of Experiment 1 and (b) test
if the smaller motor priming effect for non-human actions
is actually due to the communicative nature of the gesture
or to its complementarity or aversive nature. Therefore, we
created completely new stimulus material for the commu-
nicative gesture condition, which did not involve a comple-
mentary response or direct hand-to-hand contact. In
Experiment 2, we presented either a human or a wooden
hand making a victory sign (see Fig. 4). We also used the
transitive action stimuli from Experiment 1 as a control
condition. In line with the findings from Experiment 1,
we predicted smaller motor priming effects for non-human
actions as compared to human actions for the communica-
tive gesture, but similar positive motor priming effects for
the transitive gesture condition for both agents.
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Participants
A new group of 32 undergraduate students (16 males,
age range: 22–42, mean age: 26.2, SD: 4.5) participated
in this experiment. All participants were right-handed,
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were naive
with regard to the hypotheses of the experiment. Partici-
pants were paid €7 for participation.
5.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli
Apparatus and Stimuli were the same as used in Exper-
iment 1, except that we omitted the intransitive gesture
condition of Experiment 1. The communicative gesture
stimuli were replaced by hand stimuli making a victory
sign, photographed from a third person perspective (see
Fig. 4). The same gesture was presented depicting two dif-
ferent agents (human and wooden). At a viewing distance
of 80 cm, the communicative hand on the screen sub-
tended a visual angle 6.77" ! 13.36".
5.1.3. Procedure and design
Procedure and design were identical to Experiment 1.
We used only communicative and transitive gestures in














Fig. 4. The figures show the stimuli and design of two agents (human,
wooden) and two gesture types (communicative and transitive) used in
Experiment 2. All stimuli are shown from a third person perspective
displaying a right hand in a mirror-congruent condition.
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5.2. Results
The same outlier procedure as in Experiment 1 was ap-
plied to the data set from Experiment 2, which resulted in
the exclusion of 0.9% incorrect trials and 1.0% outliers. Con-
gruency effects for all conditions are presented in Fig. 5.
For an overview of mean RTs and mean percent errors of
all conditions of Experiment 2, including main effects, see
Table 2.
5.2.1. RT analysis
We used a 2 ! 2 ! 2-factorial design including the 2-le-
vel factor Agent (human, wooden), the 2-level factor Ges-
ture (communicative, transitive), as well as the 2-level
factor Congruency (congruent, incongruent), with all fac-
tors as within-subject variables (see Figs. 4 and 5). The
same analysis was conducted for accuracy data.
We found no main effect of Agent, F(1, 31) = 1.21,
MSe = 153.09, p > 0.05, partial g2 = 0.04, indicating that
RTs in the human and wooden conditions did not differ.
We found no main effect of Gesture, (F < 1) indicating no
differences in RTs between the transitive and the commu-
nicative gesture. Furthermore, we found a significant effect
of Congruency, F(1, 31) = 30.05, MSe = 195.55, p < 0.001,
partial g2 = 0.49, due to faster RTs in congruent (403 ms)
as compared to incongruent (413 ms) conditions. The
interaction of Agent ! Gesture approached significance,
F(1, 31) = 3.41, MSe = 133.57, p = 0.07, partial g2 = 0.10,
showing a numerical trend of slower RTs in the wooden
as compared to the human communicative condition. We
observed no significant effect of Agent ! Congruency,
(F < 1), indicating that the basic congruency effects did
not differ between the human and the wooden conditions.
Furthermore, we found no significant effect of Ges-
ture ! Congruency, F(1, 31) = 2.30, MSe = 163.28, p > 0.05,
partial g2 = 0.07, indicating no differences in the congru-
ency effect between communicative and transitive ges-
tures. Importantly, we found a significant three-way
interaction of Agent ! Gesture ! Congruency, F(1, 31) =
4.35, MSe = 105.97, p < 0.05, partial g2 = 0.12, indicating
that the significant congruency effect for the communica-
tive gesture in the human agent condition amounting to
11 ms, t(31) = 4.41, p < 0.001 was eliminated for the com-
municative gesture in the wooden condition, t(31) = 1.08,
p = 0.29, while this was not the case for the transitive ges-
ture conditions (see Fig. 5). We found a significant congru-
ency effect of 10 ms, t(31) = 3.17, p < 0.05 for transitive
gestures in the human agent condition, as well as a
14 ms congruency effect for the transitive gesture in the
wooden condition, t(31) = 4.35, p < 0.001.
5.2.2. Error analysis
For errors, only the factors Congruency, F(1, 31) = 6.81,
MSe = 2.71, p < 0.05, partial g2 = 0.18, and the interaction
of Agent ! Congruency F(1, 31) = 15.99, MSe = 1.87, p <
Fig. 5. Congruency effect (incongruent minus congruent) in milliseconds (ms) plotted with the SE of the congruency effect for Experiment 2 shown for
communicative (left panel, light gray) and transitive gestures (right panel, dark gray) of the human agent (blank bars) and the wooden agent (striped bars).
Table 2
Mean reaction times (RTs) in milliseconds (ms) and percent errors (upper
part) are shown for Agent (human, wooden), Gesture (communicative,
transitive) and Congruency (congruent, incongruent) conditions of Exper-
iment 2. Corresponding p-values for within-subjects effects (lower part) are
shown separately for RTs and percent errors.
Condition RT (ms) Error (%)
Human communicative congruent 403 0.6
Human communicative incongruent 414 1.4
Wooden communicative congruent 411 0.8
Wooden communicative incongruent 415 1.0
Human transitive congruent 400 0.3
Human transitive incongruent 411 2.0
Wooden transitive congruent 398 1.0
Wooden transitive incongruent 411 0.5
Within-subjects p(RT) p(Error)
Agent (A) n.s. n.s.
Gesture (G) n.s. n.s.
Congruency (C) <0.001b <0.05a
A ! G n.s. n.s.
A ! C n.s. <0.001b
G ! C n.s. n.s.
A ! G ! C <0.05a n.s.
a Sign (p < 0.05).
b Sign (p < 0.001), n.s. (p > 0.05).
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0.001, partial g2 = 0.34, reached significance, showing the
typical congruency effect with fewer errors in congruent
(0.7%) than in incongruent (1.2%) trials, which was mainly
due to a congruency effect in the human condition. We
found no evidence of a SAT as an explanation for the ob-
served RT effects.
5.3. Discussion
Replicating the findings of Experiment 1, we show that
human movement stimuli are more effective priming stim-
uli than non-human movement stimuli when involving a
communicative gesture but not when involving a transitive
gesture. We can also rule out the possibility that the com-
plementarity or an aversive response to the non-human
communicative action caused the differential effect for
communicative and non-communicative actions in Exper-
iment 1.
6. General discussion
Evidence from behavioral and neuroimaging research
suggests that we simulate human agents and non-human
agents differently in our motor system (Kilner et al.,
2003; Liepelt & Brass, 2010; Perani et al., 2001; Press, Gill-
meister, & Heyes, 2006; Press et al., 2005; Tai et al., 2004;
Tsai & Brass, 2007). The present study investigated
whether motor simulation of non-human agents is modu-
lated by the type of action observed. In accordance with
previous literature, our results show that human move-
ment stimuli produce stronger motor priming effects than
non-human movement stimuli when the observed action
is a communicative gesture. However, both human and
non-human movement stimuli produced similar motor
priming effects when the movement comprises a transitive
or intransitive gesture. This shows that motor simulation is
not only agent-specific, but also strongly interacts with the
type of action the agent performs.
We believe that the present results extend previous
findings by further qualifying the conditions under which
humans simulate observed behavior. Previous research
has demonstrated that whether we simulate observed
behavior depends on the observed agent (e.g., Kilner
et al., 2003; Tai et al., 2004). Furthermore, it has been dem-
onstrated that simulation also seems to depend on
whether the observed behavior belongs to the motor rep-
ertoire of the observer (Buccino et al., 2004). Our data sug-
gest that whether we motorically simulate a behavior also
depends on whether we consider this behavior as driven
by a goal that is reasonable for the agent. We do not usu-
ally consider a communicative gesture to be part of a ro-
bot’s action repertoire. On the other hand, we would
consider a robot to be able to produce a simple hand-clos-
ing gesture or to grasp a glass. This dissociation strongly
supports our previous claim that attribution of intentions
to an observed agent is a crucial factor for motor simula-
tion (Liepelt et al., 2008). Ochiai, Mushiake, and Tanji
(2005) provided evidence in favour of goal simulation
rather than simulation of the physical movement. They
showed that monkey’s premotor cortex responded not to
the actual direction in which a limb must move, but to
the visible direction of motion that is to be achieved. Fur-
thermore, Bekkering and colleagues (Bekkering et al.,
2000) were able to show that infants spontaneously imi-
tate goals rather than physical movements. Our findings
demonstrate that this goal bias already exists on an auto-
matic motor simulation level.
The dissociation of instrumental and communicative
actions is in line with a similar dissociation reported by
Cole, Gallagher, and McNeill (2002) in a deafferented pa-
tient. This patient lost the sense of touch and motor control
that both depend on proprioceptive feedback. While the
patient was able to create language and communicative
gesture patterns of normal complexity in timing and form,
he had major problems controlling a movement, such as
grasping a glass, without conscious visual attention.
6.1. Similar motor priming effects when observing non-
communicative gestures of human and non-human agents
A surprising result of our study is the observation that
transitive and intransitive actions produce the same motor
priming effects regardless of whether one observes a hu-
man or a wooden hand. This seems to be at odds with pre-
vious behavioral results showing attenuation of motor
priming effects when a non-biological agent was involved
(Kilner et al., 2003; Press et al., 2005). There are several
ways to explain this discrepancy. One way is a fundamen-
tal procedural difference between the experiments. While
participants in previous studies observed congruent and
incongruent movements while executing their response,
the observed type of movement in the present study was
always congruent. In our study, the motor priming effect
is indirectly mediated via the activation of the left or right
response hand. This would also explain whymotor priming
effects in previous experiments were substantially larger
than in the present experiment. Further, previous studies
seem to differ from the present study with respect to the
dependent variable that was measured. Kilner et al.
(2003), for example, measured the variance of a predefined
movement while observing either congruent or incongru-
ent movements. Furthermore, the non-human stimuli in
our study were more similar to the human stimuli than
they were in the study of Press and colleagues (2005)
and Kilner and colleagues (2003). One could argue that it
is more likely to attribute the intention to execute a tran-
sitive or intransitive action to a non-biological agent that
is more similar to a human agent.
6.2. Complementary action and motor priming
In Experiment 1, we observed a reversed compatibility
effect for the communicative gestures when participants
observed a human hand, while no compatibility effect oc-
curred when they observed the wooden hand. The reversal
of the compatibility effect is an interesting finding in itself.
It supports the idea that in some situations, complemen-
tary actions are the automatic response (Newman-Norl-
und, van Schie, van Zuijlen, & Bekkering, 2007; van Schie
et al., 2008). This strongly supports the idea that motor
priming depends on learning (Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes,
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2009; Catmur et al., 2008; Gillmeister, Catmur, Liepelt,
Brass, & Heyes, 2008). This finding is further in line with
the findings of a previous study showing complementary
priming effects induced by social handshake stimuli (Flach
et al., 2010). When a specific behavior is contingent on a
non-matching behavior, an incongruent association is
formed. However, in the present context, this raises the
possibility that the reduction in the motor priming effect
for the non-human agent may not be related to the com-
municative nature of the gesture but rather to its comple-
mentarity. In the second Experiment, we were able to rule
out this possibility. While Experiment 2 corroborates the
lack of an agent-specific effect for the transitive gesture,
it again shows a clear dissociation for the communicative
gesture. This time the incongruent condition shows slower
reaction times than the congruent condition when partici-
pants observed a human hand but not when observing a
non-human hand.
6.3. Effector specificity of motor priming
One additional finding of the current study is that we
observed effector-specific priming effects without con-
founding spatial compatibility. When observing a hand
from a third person perspective, participants responded
faster with the specular hand (e.g., model’s right hand/ob-
server’s left hand) than with the anatomically matching
hand (model’s right hand/observer’s right hand). The only
exception was the handshake gesture, as discussed above.
Since both left and right hands were presented centrally,
we controlled for spatial compatibility. This finding is con-
sistent with a brain imaging study by Koski and colleagues
(Koski, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Woods, & Mazziotta, 2003), who
showed stronger mirror system activation when imitating
in a specular way than in an anatomically matching way.
Interestingly, however, Aziz-Zadeh and colleagues (2002)
found stronger TMS evoked motor potentials in a passive
observation task for the anatomically matching hand. In
this study, stimuli were presented from the first person
perspective (see also Liepelt et al., 2009). A study by Mae-
da, Kleiner-Fisman, and Pascual-Leone (2002) directly
compared motor evoked potentials when observing a right
hand from the first and the third person perspective. They
found stronger motor evoked potentials in the right hand
when observing a right hand movement from a first person
perspective compared with a right hand movement from
the third person perspective. Taken together, these find-
ings suggest that when observing a hand from the third
person perspective, the mirroring hand is activated but
when observing a hand from the first person perspective,
the anatomically matching hand is activated. The only
study that is not consistent with this claim is a study by
Press and colleagues (Press, Bird, Walsh, & Heyes, 2008).
They found the same motor priming effects when partici-
pants responded with their right hand regardless of
whether they saw a right or a left hand from a first person
perspective. However, we believe that the dependent mea-
sure was not sensitive enough in this study. Participants al-
ways had to respond with one hand and therefore small
pre-activation of the hand was presumably not detectable.
7. Conclusion
In conclusion, the present study shows that it is the rea-
sonableness of the apparent goal the observer attributes to
the observed behavior that influences the observer’s men-
tal simulation process, such that those processes are
evoked only when the observed behavior appears to be dri-
ven by a reasonable goal. On a more abstract level, our
findings are in line with the assumption of top-down influ-
ences on motor simulation (Liepelt et al., 2008; Longo &
Bertenthal, 2009; Stanley et al., 2007).
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